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Abstract 
 
This Chapter studies the EU Securitisation Regulation of 2017, with particular focus on its criteria for simple, 
transparent and standardised (STS) securitisation, as an instance of transnational legal ordering. Two 
discrete aspects of transnationalisation stand out. The first aspect explains why the Securitisation 
Regulation should be regarded as transnational legal ordering, although it is by form ordinary EU 
legislation. The explanation is found in what can be described as a symbiotic relationship between the EU 
and transnational bodies, particularly the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and in the involvement of a broad epistemic 
community in international finance. The second aspect of transnationalisation focuses on the potential 
extra-EU effects of the Securitisation Regulation. Possible scenarios include fragmentation of global 
markets, but also the Securitisation Regulation becoming a model for other jurisdictions, and norm export 
through a future equivalence regime for third-country securitisers. 
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1 Introduction 
 
At the end of 2017, the EU adopted the Securitisation Regulation,1 accompanied by related amendments to 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.2 The Securitisation Regulation forms a 
regulatory layer on top of Member State laws and legal practices, affecting both the legality and feasibility 
of securitisation transactions and schemes in the EU. It recasts earlier fragmentary and sector-specific 
legislation and introduces a general, cross-sectoral regime with a new incentive-based regulatory approach, 
involving a set of criteria for ‘simple, transparent and standardised’ (‘STS’) securitisation.3 
This Chapter studies the Securitisation Regulation as an instance of transnational legal ordering.4 
While the Securitisation Regulation represents internally oriented and formal EU lawmaking, it builds on 
much broader expert work, including at the global level. Particularly significant is the work of the Basel 
 
1 Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of 12 December 2017 laying down a general framework for 
securitisation and creating a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation, and 
amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC and 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 
648/2012 [2017] OJ L347/35 (Securitisation Regulation). The Securitisation Regulation entered into force on 17 
January 2018 and will apply from 1 January 2019 (Art 48). This time gap enables drafting and adopting the regulatory 
and implementing technical standards necessary for its functioning. 
2 Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 of 12 December 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms [2017] OJ L347/1. 
3 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common 
rules on securitisation and creating a European framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation and 
amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 
648/2012’ COM (2015) 472 final, 13.  
4 The notion of transnational legal ordering used here broadly follows Terence C Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, 
‘Transnational Legal Orders’ in Terence C Halliday and Gregory Shaffer (eds), Transnational Legal Orders (CUP 2015) 7–
21. 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), both of which exemplify transnational bodies in financial regulation.5 The relationship between 
transnational bodies and the EU shows symbiotic attributes in the light of the Securitisation Regulation. The 
symbiosis appears mutualistic in that all parties are able to advance their aims, while the exact source of 
regulatory ideas or influence is often difficult to pinpoint. Another aspect of transnationalisation here is 
that the Securitisation Regulation holds some potential for extra-EU effects, including export of its 
provisions, policy choices and underlying values. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes securitisation as a financing technique to the extent 
necessary to follow the discussion. It also explains the dual aim of the Securitisation Regulation to ‘restart’ 
or ‘revive’ EU securitisation markets and at the same time to make them more ‘sustainable’.6 Section 3 
discusses the two main categories of norms by which the Securitisation Regulation aims to steer market 
actor behaviour. These are, on the one hand, rules that directly prescribe or prohibit certain action, and, on 
the other hand, the STS criteria, which affect actor behaviour through more indirect incentives. The STS 
criteria, in particular, have transnational origins, which the Section attempts to trace. Section 4 focuses on 
the different aspects of sustainability in the Securitisation Regulation. What adds particular interest to the 
promotion of sustainability from the standpoint of transnational legal ordering is that the EU is often 
expected to show particular responsibility in its actions, an expectation supported by primary EU law. 
Section 5 discusses the potential extra-EU effects of the Securitisation Regulation, completing our account 
of transnationalisation. The Chapter concludes with a summary in Section 6. 
 
 
2 Securitisation and the dual aim of the Securitisation Regulation 
 
In media and colloquial speech, one typical description of securitisation is ‘a process where assets, such as 
mortgages, auto loans or consumer credit, are packed together and sold on to investors as bonds’.7 While 
this is correct, understanding regulatory needs and means requires some familiarity with the legal structure 
of securitisation. The following basic structure suffices for the rest of this Chapter. 
Securitisation generally involves pooling together of credit claims and refinancing the pool by 
selling it to a specially established company or other entity, termed ‘securitisation special purpose entity’ 
(‘SSPE’) in the Securitisation Regulation.8 The SSPE in turn finances the purchase by issuing debt securities 
(bonds) backed by the pool, to be sold to investors in capital markets. Issued debt securities are often 
divided into tranches so that they come with different risk and return profiles (different levels of seniority) 
to cater for different investor preferences. Investors receive interest payments funded by payments made 
by the debtors of the credit claims. In this way, the risk associated with the credit claims is transferred from 
the originator of securitisation (say, a lender bank) to the SSPE and ultimately to third-party investors.9 
The Securitisation Regulation forms part of the Commission’s Capital Markets Union plan, which in 
general terms aims to diversify sources of financing (reduce reliance on banks), unlock capital for the 
 
5 See Tony Porter, ‘Post-crisis Transnational Financial Regulation and Complexity in Global Governance’ in Tony Porter 
(ed), Transnational Financial Regulation after the Crisis (Routledge 2014) 7–11. 
6 See COM (2015) 472 final, 3, 7, 58. 
7 Thomas Hale, ‘EU Lawmakers Reach Deal on Securitisation Market Reforms’, Financial Times (London, 30 May 2017) 
<www.ft.com/content/6870f240-bb19-369b-b069-3f6247078cc4> accessed 30 September 2018. 
8 Securitisation Regulation, Art 2. Other common terms meaning the same are ‘special purpose entity’ (‘SPE’) and 
‘special purpose vehicle’ (‘SPV’). 
9 See Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), ‘High-Quality Securitisation for Europe: The Market at a 
Crossroads’ (2014) 5, available at <www.afme.eu/en/reports/publications/afme-high-quality-securitisation-for-
europe> accessed 30 September 2018. AFME notes that investors are ‘typically banks’ treasury departments, 
insurance companies and a range of investment funds’. 
economy and promote cross-border investment.10 The Securitisation Regulation itself pursues a dual aim 
regarding EU securitisation markets, namely to ‘restart markets’ (aim 1) ‘on a more sustainable basis’ (aim 
2).11 Both aims should be seen in connection with the financial crisis of 2007–08. 
The aim of restarting markets is understandable against the backdrop that in Europe issuance to 
third-party investors dropped from a peak of EUR 477.6 billion in 2006 to ‘almost nothing’ in 2009,12 after 
which recovery has been slow.13 The Commission and co-legislators wish to promote recovery because they 
see securitisation as ‘an important element of well-functioning financial markets’, as follows: 
 
Soundly structured securitisation is an important channel for diversifying funding sources and 
allocating risk more widely within the Union financial system. It allows for a broader distribution of 
financial-sector risk and can help free up originators’ balance sheets to allow for further lending to 
the economy. Overall, it can improve efficiencies in the financial system and provide additional 
investment opportunities. Securitisation can create a bridge between credit institutions and capital 
markets with an indirect benefit for businesses and citizens (through, for example, less expensive 
loans and business financing, and credits for immovable property and credit cards).14 
 
In the Commission’s estimate, returning to pre-crisis average issuance levels could enable credit institutions 
to provide EUR 100–150 billion of additional credit to the private sector.15 
The aim of promoting sustainability recognises the role that certain uses and abuses of 
securitisation played among the causes of the US subprime mortgage crisis, which resulted in the global 
financial crisis.16 Accordingly, the Commission has called for ‘creating a sustainable market for 
securitisation, without repeating the mistakes made before the crisis’. One particular concern for the 
Commission is investor protection and systemic risk management by preventing the recurrence of so-called 
originate-to-distribute models, in which lenders apply lax underwriting standards because they know that 
credit risk will be passed on to third-party investors. Other concerns include avoiding a weakening of 
investor due diligence, which may result from overreliance on third parties such as credit rating agencies.17 
The co-legislators emphasise, among other things, ‘the risks of increased interconnectedness and of 
excessive leverage that securitisation raises’. Thus, the Securitisation Regulation enhances microprudential 
supervision of financial institutions participating in securitisation markets as well as macroprudential 
oversight of securitisation markets, including by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).18 
The main means under the Securitisation Regulation to ‘restart markets on a more sustainable 
basis’ is to identify STS (simple, transparent and standardised) securitisations, so that these can be afforded 
 
10 See <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-investment/capital-markets-union/what-
capital-markets-union_en> accessed 30 September 2018; Commission, ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets 
Union’ (Communication) COM (2015) 468 final. 
11 COM (2015) 472 final, 3. See the Securitisation Regulation, Rec 2. 
12 AFME (n 9) 14. 
13 According to AFME statistics, annual European placed issuance (that is, issuance placed with third-party investors) 
rose above EUR 100 billion (to EUR 111.7 billion) in 2017 for the first time after the financial crisis. See AFME, ‘Data 
Snapshot: AFME Securitisation: Q2 2018’, available at 
<www.afme.eu/globalassets/downloads/data/securitisation/2018/afme-stn-securitisation-data-snapshot-q2-
2018.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018. 
14 Securitisation Regulation, Rec 4. See COM (2015) 472 final, 19–20. 
15 COM (2015) 472 final, 11. 
16 For a concise overview of the various causes, see Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (OUP 2013) 
21–31. See also Orkun Akseli, ‘Was Securitisation the Culprit? Explanation of Legal Processes behind Creation of 
Mortgage-Backed Sub-prime Securities’ in Joanna Gray and Orkun Akseli (eds), Financial Regulation in Crisis? The Role 
of Law and the Failure of Northern Rock (Edward Elgar 2011) 2–13. 
17 COM (2015) 472 final, 2–3, 8, 23. 
18 Securitisation Regulation, Rec 4. 
more risk-sensitive regulatory (prudential) treatment.19 As for the aim of restarting markets, this approach 
appears promising because the post-crisis regulatory framework is generally seen as holding back the 
growth of securitisation. According to the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), the 
‘regulatory treatment was calibrated to reflect the weak performance of some US securitised assets – 
notably, US sub-prime mortgages – during the financial crisis, rather than the strong performance of 
European securitisation’.20 As for the aim of promoting sustainability, the Commission importantly states 
that ‘[t]here is no intention to undo what has been put in place in the EU to address the risks inherent in 
highly complex, opaque and risky securitisation’.21 
 
 
3 Norm categories in the Securitisation Regulation: rules and the STS criteria 
 
The Securitisation Regulation aims to steer market actor behaviour by norms that can be divided into two 
main categories. The first category comprises rules that directly prescribe or prohibit certain action (‘rules’). 
The second category consists in the STS criteria, which affect actor behaviour through more indirect 
incentives (‘STS criteria’). We start with a brief look at each category and then focus on the transnational 
origins of the STS criteria. 
The rules express, among other things, requirements, restrictions and conditions addressed to 
different participants in the chain of transactions that securitisation involves. This chain begins with the 
granting of credit to individual debtors and ends in the selling of debt securities to third-party investors. 
The following examples are taken from the ‘General Provisions’ (Chapter 1) and ‘Provisions Applicable to All 
Securitisations’ (Chapter 2) of the Securitisation Regulation, sequenced here according to the transaction 
chain, rather than article numbering. 
To begin with, the ‘Criteria for credit-granting’ (Article 9) require that originators, sponsors and 
original lenders apply to exposures (credit claims, receivables) to be securitised ‘the same sound and well-
defined criteria for credit-granting which they apply to non-securitised exposures’. The specification of how 
this is to be achieved emphasises assessment of creditworthiness. The ‘Ban on resecuritisation’ (Article 8) 
provides that the underlying exposures in a securitisation (the securities of which were issued on or after 1 
January 2019) must not include securitisation positions, but this may be permissible for a number of 
‘legitimate purposes’. 
The ‘Requirements for SSPEs’ (Article 4) restrict the third countries in which an SSPE can be 
established, with the aim of excluding ‘high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions’ and ensuring 
information exchange on tax matters. The requirement of ‘Risk retention’ (Article 6) provides that the 
originator, sponsor or original lender must ‘retain on an ongoing basis a material net economic interest in 
the securitisation of not less than 5 %’, and detailed guidance is given on how this requirement is to be 
fulfilled. The requirement is meant to align the interests of originators, sponsors, original lenders and 
investors.22 The ‘Transparency requirements for originators, sponsors and SSPEs’ (Article 7) comprise an 
elaborate list of information duties towards holders of a securitisation position, competent authorities and 
potential investors. 
‘Selling of securitisations to retail clients’ (Article 3) is only allowed under a set of conditions, 
including performance of a suitability test. Finally, the ‘Due-diligence requirements for institutional 
investors’ (Article 5) consist of matters that an institutional investor must verify or assess before holding a 
securitisation position, or do while holding a securitisation position. In sum, the rules in ‘General Provisions’ 
 
19 ibid Recs 2–3. 
20 AFME (n 9) 4. AFME represents global and European banks and other capital market players. 
21 COM (2015) 472 final, 3. 
22 Securitisation Regulation, Rec 10. 
and ‘Provisions Applicable to All Securitisations’ cover more or less the entire transaction chain of 
securitisation. 
In turn, the STS criteria serve the framework that the Securitisation Regulation creates for STS 
securitisations. The role of the STS criteria is to identify securitisations that fit into the STS framework, so 
that investments in them may benefit from more risk-sensitive prudential treatment, including preferential 
treatment in terms of capital requirements, as enacted separately.23 Importantly, the availability of more 
risk-sensitive prudential treatment is expected to incentivise securitisations that fulfil the STS criteria, and 
thereby advance the dual aim of market restarting and sustainability.24 
The STS criteria include specific requirements for simplicity (Article 20), standardisation (Article 21) 
and transparency (Article 22). These are discussed in Section 4 below.25 Securitisers (originators, sponsors 
and SSPEs) may label their securitisation ‘STS’ only where the securitisation meets all these requirements. 
Further conditions are that an ‘STS notification’ of the securitisation has been made to the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which has then included the securitisation in a list maintained on 
its official website.26 
While the STS criteria form part of EU secondary legislation, the EU cannot claim all credit for them 
as a regulatory idea. This is because the STS criteria have transnational origins and should be seen as part of 
global efforts to develop criteria for safer or higher quality securitisation. In fact, it is difficult if not 
impossible to pinpoint the exact role of the EU in these efforts. 
Recital 19 of the Securitisation Regulation names two essential bases for the STS criteria: first, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) criteria of 23 July 2015 ‘for identifying simple, transparent and comparable securitisations in the 
framework of capital sufficiency for securitisations’; second (and ‘in particular’), the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) opinion of 7 July 2015 ‘on a European framework for qualifying securitisation’. A closer look 
 
23 For the amended prudential treatment for credit institutions and investment firms, see Reg (EU) 2017/2401. 
Correspondingly for insurers, see Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1221 of 1 June 2018 amending 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 as regards the calculation of regulatory capital requirements for securitisations 
and simple, transparent and standardised securitisations held by insurance and reinsurance undertakings [2018] OJ 
L227/1. We should note that preferential treatment of STS securitisations may result in either higher or lower capital 
requirements compared to those under the pre-amendment rules. This is because the amendments also address 
‘excessively low risk weights for highly-rated securitisation tranches and, conversely, excessively high risk weights for 
low-rated tranches’, as noted in Rec 3 of Reg (EU) 2017/2401. For a detailed analysis, taking into account the different 
calculation approaches, credit quality steps and the maturity of securitisation positions, see Andrea Flunker, Tanja 
Schlösser and Andrea Weber, ‘The New European Framework for ABS Transactions’ (Deloitte White Paper No 81, 
2018) 25–33, available at <www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/financial-
services/Deloitte_European%20regulatory%20framework%20for%20ABS.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018. See also 
Gerard Kastelein, ‘Securitization in the Capital Markets Union: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’ in Danny Busch, 
Emilios Avgouleas and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Capital Markets Union in Europe (OUP 2018) 483. In Kastelein’s view, the 
Commission’s press releases, emphasising differential treatment for STS securitisations, have created ‘the wrong 
impression that the [capital requirement] rules would be relaxed compared to the current situation’. 
24 According to Flunker, Schlösser and Weber (n 23, at 32), from the standpoint of investor institutions, ‘equity capital 
relief for high-quality securitisations appears desirable and is fundamentally capable of stimulating investment in 
certain securitisation positions’, provided that ‘the STS classification does not give rise to any difficulties or doubts’ 
and ‘alternative investments available to the institutions do not require a lower level of regulatory capital in 
comparison’. On earlier EU steps towards differentiated regulatory treatment, concerning the prudential 
requirements for insurers and the liquidity of credit institutions, see COM (2015) 472 final, 4–5. 
25 For simplicity, this Chapter only discusses provisions on long-term securitisation. Corresponding requirements for 
short-term securitisation known as ABCP (asset-backed commercial paper) securitisation are found in Arts 23–6 of the 
Securitisation Regulation. 
26 Securitisation Regulation, Arts 18 and 27. An STS securitisation does not benefit from more risk-sensitive prudential 
treatment automatically, but must comply with additional requirements laid down in the capital requirement rules. 
For an overview, see Kastelein (n 23) 480–81. 
at these bases gives further insights into the development of the STS criteria, especially regarding the EU’s 
role in the transnational processes involved. 
The BCBS and IOSCO, whose joint Task Force on Securitisation Markets (TFSM) was charged with 
the groundwork for the above-mentioned criteria, do not specifically mention the EU in their account of 
developing the criteria. They state, rather generally, that the ‘TFSM collected data, surveyed national 
authorities and market participants, and undertook bilateral interviews as part of its assessment of 
securitisation markets’. Based on this work, they ‘published for consultation 14 criteria to identify certain 
features of simple, transparent and comparable securitisations’.27 
However, the Commission mentions the following, describing its own collection and use of 
expertise: ‘The Commission has gained valuable insights through its participation in the discussions and 
exchange of views informing the BCBS-IOSCO joint task force on securitisation markets and through its 
involvement in the BCBS work on the review of the capital treatment.’28 In the BCBS, the EU is represented 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism, while the Commission and the 
EBA are observers,29 which can be ‘involved in task forces and working groups, and may contribute 
comments on consultative papers’.30 We should note the role of the ECB and the EBA as producers of 
influential discussion papers.31 In IOSCO, the Commission and ESMA are associate members (ESMA is also 
an observer to the IOSCO Board).32 All in all, the relationship of the EU to the BCBS and IOSCO appears to 
have been a two-way street in terms of information and influence. If this observation is correct, then the 
EU can be credited for participating even in the transnational origins of the STS criteria. 
It is also useful to look at how the EBA has perceived its work in relation to work by the BCBS and 
IOSCO. In one telling passage the EBA observes that the recommendations provided in its report ‘will have 
to be revisited depending on the progress and decisions taken by the Basel and IOSCO Committees on the 
definition of a simple transparent and comparable securitisations framework, at the global level, and the 
re-calibration of the BCBS 2014 securitisation framework to provide regulatory recognition to STC 
securitisations’. And further: ‘The criteria proposed in this report for the definition of qualifying 
securitisations may have to be amended based on the final STC [simple, transparent and comparable] 
framework adopted at the global level.’33 Given that the STS criteria are based ‘in particular’ on the EBA 
 
27 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(BCBS and IOSCO Board), Criteria for Identifying Simple, Transparent and Comparable Securitisations (Bank for 
International Settlements 2015) 4, available at <www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d332.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018. 
28 COM (2015) 472 final, 11. 
29 <www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm> accessed 30 September 2018. 
30 Jan Wouters and Jed Odermatt, ‘International Banking Standards, Private Law, and the European Union’ in Marise 
Cremona and Hans-W Micklitz (eds), Private Law in the External Relations of the EU (OUP 2016) 184. 
31 For a brief account, see Deloitte, ‘STS Easy as STC, Easy as 1, 2, 3. Or Is It? Operational Efforts to Revive the 
Securitisation Market’ (February 2016, updated May 2018) 2, available at 
<www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-uk-fs-banking-sts-easy-as-
stc.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018. Deloitte refers to a joint paper by the Bank of England (BoE) and the ECB in 
May 2014, suggesting it as ‘the first public move by central banks to consider differentiating between securitisation 
transactions that met certain qualifying criteria’, and to a paper by the EBA in October 2014. Deloitte also notes that a 
joint paper by the BCBS and IOSCO in December 2014 ‘touched many of the same topics as the ECB/BoE paper of six 
months earlier, but it also drew together some of the wider thinking that had gone on globally’. 
32 <www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=membership&memid=2> accessed 30 September 2018. See Antonio Marcacci, 
‘The EU in the Transnational Financial Regulatory Arena: The Case of IOSCO’ in Cremona and Micklitz (n 30) 215–19. 
33 European Banking Authority, ‘EBA Report on Qualifying Securitisation: Response to the Commission’s Call for Advice 
of January 2014 on Long-Term Financing’ (2015) 112, available at 
<www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/950548/EBA+report+on+qualifying+securitisation.pdf> accessed 30 
September 2018. The report accompanies the ‘Opinion of the European Banking Authority on a European Framework 
for Qualifying Securitisation’ (EBA/Op/2015/14, 7 July 2015), available at 
<www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/983359/EBA-Op-2015-14+Opinion+on+qualifying+securitisation.pdf> 
accessed 30 September 2018. 
opinion, the above implies that the STS criteria aim to avoid unnecessary contradictions with the 
corresponding global criteria. Even so, the STS and STC criteria are far from being identical.34 
We could continue mapping the various transnational influences behind the STS criteria on the 
basis of further written sources, but that would probably never result in a full picture. This is because part 
of the influences is likely to be more nebulous by nature, and probably best explained as workings of an 
epistemic community in international finance.35 This relates to what Daniel Mügge describes as ‘the 
emergence over the years of a transatlantic circle of financial regulators, experts, and professionals who 
share a common understanding of the regulatory world they inhabit’.36 What fits into this picture is the 
Commission telling that it ‘has met with public authorities, central banks, private sector representatives 
and the IMF’ to collect information and views on securitisation.37 Moreover, private actors have developed 
their own notions (and labels) of ‘high-quality securitisation’, which have probably informed the broader 
epistemic community.38 In fact, the discussions of such notions first started within the industry.39 
In sum, the EU has played a role in global efforts to develop criteria for safer or higher quality 
securitisation. The European STS criteria should be seen as part of those efforts, while the global STC 
criteria have provided an essential basis for the STS criteria. The relationship between the EU and the 
relevant transnational bodies, particularly the BCBS and IOSCO, can be described as a mutualistic symbiosis 
in that all parties manage to advance their aims. To be sure, they share the same aims to a great extent. 
This symbiotic relationship and the involvement of a broad epistemic community, if nothing else, justify 
speaking of the Securitisation Regulation as transnational legal ordering. 
The BCBS and IOSCO have received input from the EU in the shape of information and expertise. 
What is more, they have been presented with a partial concretisation of their transnationally developed 
regulatory model, and consequently a partial substantiation of the global efforts involved. Indeed, the STS 
criteria can be understood as a European elaborated incarnation of the global STC criteria, despite clear 
differences between the two, and as a vessel for transnationally developed regulatory ideas.40 
 
34 The original STC criteria comprise 14 criteria, each of which relates to one or more of the three purposes: simplicity, 
transparency and comparability. In addition, each criterion addresses one of the following types of risk: asset risk 
(‘Generic criteria relating to the underlying asset pool’), structural risk (‘Transparency around the securitisation 
structure’) or fiduciary and servicer risk (‘Governance of key parties to the securitisation process’). See BCBS and 
IOSCO Board (n 27) 5–13. The original set of criteria was supplemented with additional criteria when the STC criteria 
were incorporated in the Basel III capital framework for securitisation (document references in n 40 below). For a 
detailed comparison between the STC criteria and STS criteria as proposed by the Commission, see Dominic M Lerario, 
‘The Basel Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ “Criteria for Identifying Simple, 
Transparent and Comparable Securitisations”: Not So Simple’, 42–67, available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2727772> accessed 30 September 2018. Lerario finds (at 44) 
that ‘[a]lthough similar, these two legal frameworks could, if adopted by different jurisdictions, lead to legal 
heterogeneity and instability’. 
35 On the notion of epistemic community, see generally Peter M Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and 
International Policy Coordination’ (1992) 46 International Organization 1, 3. Briefly defined, an epistemic community is 
‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’. According to Haas, the members of an epistemic 
community share normative and principled beliefs, causal beliefs, notions of knowledge validity, and have a common 
policy enterprise, meaning ‘a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed’. 
36 Daniel Mügge, ‘Introduction’ in Daniel Mügge (ed), Europe and the Governance of Global Finance (OUP 2014) 3–4. 
37 COM (2015) 472 final, 11. The Commission notes having built in its own public consultations on three public 
consultations carried out in 2014 by the ECB and the Bank of England, the BCBS and IOSCO, and the EBA, respectively. 
38 AFME (n 9) 8. AFME refers to the Prime Collateralised Securities (PCS) industry initiative. See 
<http://pcsmarket.org> accessed 30 September 2018. 
39 See Deloitte (n 31) 2. 
40 cf BCBS and IOSCO Board (n 27) 3. The BCBS and IOSCO note that the STC criteria ‘are not, of themselves, a 
prescription for regulatory action’. Therefore, one may question the correctness of calling them a ‘regulatory model’. 
Alternatively, the Securitisation Regulation and the STS criteria can be seen as something to which 
transnational normativity attaches, and from which transnational normativity acquires its legality, meaning 
here its legal form and legal authority. The EU in turn has received a transnationally developed regulatory 
model to build on and adapt for its purposes.41 Arguably, a transnational regulatory model comes with 
transnational normativity and a degree of justificatory and legitimating force. 
 
 
4 Sustainability in the Securitisation Regulation 
 
The only time the Securitisation Regulation explicitly mentions sustainability is a reference in Recital 2 to 
‘the Commission’s priority objective of supporting job creation and a return to sustainable growth’. In 
contrast, the Commission Proposal for a Securitisation Regulation mentions it several times, usually in 
connection with the intention to create a sustainable market for securitisation. The Commission Proposal 
does not define ‘sustainability’, but uses it often in considerations of financial stability and investor 
protection, with references to the lessons of the US subprime mortgage crisis and the global financial 
crisis.42 Clearly, then, in the Commission Proposal and the Securitisation Regulation, sustainability is seen 
above all as the desirable functioning of securitisation markets, rather than as attainment of (non-financial) 
goals external to those markets. 
We noted in Section 3 that the ‘General Provisions’ (Chapter 1) and ‘Provisions Applicable to All 
Securitisations’ (Chapter 2) of the Securitisation Regulation deal with different links (and participants) in the 
chain of transactions that securitisation involves. Covering the entire securitisation chain in this way is 
indeed advisable from the perspective of sustainability as the desirable functioning of securitisation 
markets. For example, the problem of originate-to-distribute models and irresponsible or even abusive 
lending practices most likely cannot be tackled by merely regulating lending standards and supervision.43 
What is needed in addition is regulation of the other links in the transaction chain so as to diminish the 
demand for securitised debt of dubious lending standards and the profitability of originate-to-distribute 
models.44 
However, the primary contribution of the Securitisation Regulation to creating a sustainable 
securitisation market is the STS criteria (and recalibrated prudential treatment). As the BCBS and IOSBO 
note, ‘[a]n important lesson from the 2007–09 financial crisis was that the securitisation structure itself can 
represent a source of risk’. This is so because ‘complex and opaque structures may render it unfeasible for 
some investors to understand the cash flow-generating mechanism and where disruptions may arise in the 
future’.45 The STS criteria attempt to incentivise market actors away from such structures (with the 
 
But the STC criteria should be regarded as a regulatory model at least since they were incorporated in the Basel III 
capital framework for securitisation. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III Document: Revisions to the 
Securitisation Framework, Amended to Include the Alternative Capital Treatment for ‘Simple, Transparent and 
Comparable’ Securitisations, 11 December 2014 (rev July 2016) (Bank for International Settlements 2016), available at 
<www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d374.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Standard: Capital Treatment for Short-Term ‘Simple, Transparent and Comparable’ Securitisations, May 2018 (Bank for 
International Settlements 2018), available at <www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d442.pdf> accessed 30 September 2018. 
41 COM (2015) 472 final, 5. 
42 ibid 2–10. 
43 See Robert J Shiller, Finance and the Good Society (Princeton University Press 2012) 51. Shiller writes: ‘There 
remains so much in the process of issuing a mortgage that simply cannot be seen and policed by the government.’ He 
points out the typical imbalance between ‘the least financially informed party, the future homeowner(s), and 
sophisticated professional financial representatives’. In the Securitisation Regulation, securitisations of residential 
loans are subject to certain special requirements regarding the marketing and underwriting of loans. See Arts 9(2) and 
20(10). 
44 See Teemu Juutilainen, ‘Law-Based Commodification of Private Debt’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 743, 752–3. 
45 BCBS and IOSCO Board (n 27) 3. 
availability of more risk-sensitive prudential treatment to STS securitisations). As regards the risks of STS 
securitisation, the Commission explains: ‘The “STS standard” does not mean that the securitisation 
concerned is free of risks, but means that the product respects a number of criteria and that a prudent and 
diligent investor will be able to analyse the risk involved.’46 
The STS criteria comprise specific requirements for simplicity (Article 20), standardisation (Article 
21) and transparency (Article 22).47 The following examples are meant to provide a brief but representative 
overview of the types of requirement. Therefore, the discussion is necessarily selective and simplified. 
The simplicity requirements include that the title to the underlying exposures (credit claims, 
receivables) must be acquired by the SSPE by way of a true sale or assignment or transfer with the same 
legal effect in a manner enforceable against the seller or any other third party (Article 20(1));48 the 
underlying exposures acquired by the SSPE must meet predetermined, clear and documented eligibility 
criteria which do not allow active portfolio management of the exposures on a discretionary basis (Article 
20(7)); the securitisation must be backed by a pool of underlying exposures that are homogeneous in terms 
of asset type, taking into account the cash flow-related specific characteristics of the asset type, and a pool 
of underlying exposures must comprise only one asset type (Article 20(8)); the underlying exposures must 
not include any securitisation position, that is to say, resecuritisation is not allowed (Article 20(9)); the 
underlying exposures must be originated in the ordinary course of the originator’s or original lender’s 
business pursuant to underwriting standards no less stringent than those applied at the time of origination 
to similar exposures that are not securitised (Article 20(10)). 
The standardisation requirements include that the originator, sponsor or original lender must 
satisfy the risk-retention requirement in accordance with Article 6 (Article 21(1)); the interest-rate and 
currency risks arising from the securitisation must be appropriately mitigated, disclosing any measures to 
that effect; the SSPE must not enter into derivative contracts, except for hedging interest-rate or currency 
risks, and must ensure that the pool of underlying exposures does not include derivatives (Article 21(2)); 
any referenced interest payments under the securitisation assets and liabilities must be based on generally 
used market interest rates, or generally used sectoral rates reflective of the cost of funds, and must not 
reference complex formulae or derivatives (Article 21(3)). Further standardisation requirements concern, 
among other things, the effects of an enforcement or an acceleration notice (Article 21(4)) and the 
contents of the transaction documentation (Article 21(6)–(10)). 
The transparency requirements mainly include information duties, such as making available data on 
static and dynamic historical default and loss performance for substantially similar exposures to those 
being securitised (Article 22(1)) and a liability cash flow model (Article 22(3)). Additionally, they include 
external verification of a sample of the underlying exposures before issuance of the securities resulting 
from the securitisation (Article 22(2)) and STS securitisation-specific modifications to certain transparency 
requirements applicable to all securitisations (Article 22(5)). 
One transparency requirement should be mentioned separately because it broadens the idea of 
sustainability in the Securitisation Regulation beyond financial stability, investor protection and other goals 
immediately related to the functioning of securitisation markets, namely to environmental 
considerations.49 This requirement, found in Article 22(4), provides that in a securitisation where the 
 
46 COM (2015) 472 final, 15. 
47 The corresponding provisions on ABCP (asset-backed commercial paper) securitisations in Arts 23–6 are again 
omitted from discussion. 
48 This requirement entails that synthetic securitisations currently cannot be STS. In a synthetic securitisation, the 
credit risk of the underlying exposures is transferred through a derivative contract or guarantees. See the 
Securitisation Regulation, Rec 24 and Art 45. 
49 For the broader context, see Commission, ‘Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth’ (Communication) COM 
(2018) 97 final, 2. The term ‘sustainable finance’, the Commission notes, ‘generally refers to the process of taking due 
account of environmental and social considerations in investment decision-making, leading to increased investments 
underlying exposures are residential loans or auto loans or leases, the originator and sponsor must publish 
the available information related to the environmental performance of the assets financed by such loans or 
leases. Moreover, the need to extend this provision to securitisation where the underlying exposures are 
not residential loans or auto loans or leases will be reviewed by 1 January 2022, ‘with a view to 
mainstreaming environmental, social and governance disclosure’ (Article 46(f)). 
Another noteworthy sustainability-related provision, and a further aspect of sustainability, is found 
in Article 4, ‘Requirements for SSPEs’ (one of the ‘General Provisions’ of Chapter 1). Indeed, these 
requirements can be linked to social considerations of sustainability.50 They provide that SSPEs must not be 
established in a third country if (a) the third country is listed as a high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdiction 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),51 or (b) the third country has not signed an agreement with a 
Member State to ensure full compliance with certain standards of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) on exchange of information on tax matters, and effectiveness of that 
exchange, including any multilateral tax agreements. Besides broadening sustainability considerations, the 
FATF and OECD connection further completes the picture of the Securitisation Regulation as legal ordering 
in symbiosis with transnational bodies. 
It is not the purpose of this Chapter to assess the sufficiency of the STS criteria or other 
‘sustainability features’ (to coin a term for them) in the Securitisation Regulation. Still, we should note that 
the effects of these features depend on several other factors, including supervision. Doubts have been 
raised in the literature, among other things because the main supervisory tasks and powers are allocated to 
national authorities (Articles 29–30).52 At the central level, the three European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs, that is, ESMA, the EBA and EIOPA, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) 
play chiefly coordinating roles (Article 36). However, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is entrusted 
with macroprudential oversight of the EU securitisation market (Article 31). 
How should we assess the sustainability features of the Securitisation Regulation from the 
standpoint of transnational legal ordering? Speaking of the Securitisation Regulation as transnational legal 
ordering was justified in Section 3 above largely on the basis of symbiotic attributes in the relationship 
between the EU and transnational bodies, particularly the BCBS and IOSCO, the developers of the STC 
criteria. But the STS criteria deviated significantly from the STC criteria even in the Commission Proposal for 
a Securitisation Regulation.53 Further deviations and additional sustainability features were introduced and 
debated in the course of the EU legislative process, which culminated in terms of content with the 
interinstitutional compromise of 30 May 2017.54 What happened in the adoption of the Securitisation 
Regulation at the end of 2017 was that the transnational regulatory model and transnational normativity of 
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51 The FATF is an intergovernmental body to set standards and promote efficient implementation of measures for 
combating threats to the integrity of the international financial system, especially money laundering and terrorist 
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Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium (issue 3) 24–5, available at 
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the global STC criteria were partially – but just partially – legalised, that is to say, vested with legal form and 
legal authority, that is, those of EU secondary legislation. 
This partiality, insofar as it results from sustainability features, is consistent with the general 
observation that the EU is often expected to show particular responsibility in its actions. Indeed, these 
expectations find strong support in EU primary law.55 From the standpoint of transnational normativity, and 
transnational bodies, partiality may be seen as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, partial legalisation 
should be better than no legalisation at all. On the other hand, partial legalisation that involves European 
idiosyncrasies, whether or not they count as sustainability features, easily reduces cross-border 
compatibility with the rest of the world. This calls for attention whenever the EU engages in transnational 
legal ordering. 
 
 
5 Securitisation Regulation and extra-EU effects 
 
Viewed from outside the EU, the Securitisation Regulation probably appears uninviting. The reasons include 
its detailedness and unfamiliar content. Even if an external actor knows the STC criteria developed by the 
BCBS and IOSCO and recognises their family resemblance with the STS criteria in the Securitisation 
Regulation, differences between the two are likely to cause confusion.56 
What is more, the Securitisation Regulation effectively shuts third-country securitisers out of the 
STS framework. This follows from Article 18, according to which ‘[t]he originator, sponsor and SSPE 
involved in a securitisation considered STS shall be established in the Union’. The following quote from 
Alexander Batchvarov of Merrill Lynch may well reflect a common sentiment within the industry: ‘This is 
just another brick in the wall of the domestication and fragmentation of global capital markets. Suddenly, 
anything that Europeans buy outside Europe becomes non-STS.’57 
Although it currently seems that shutting third-country securitisers out of the STS framework and 
consequently compartmentalising global securitisation markets will be the main external effects of the 
Securitisation Regulation, this is not necessarily so. We can imagine at least two scenarios where the 
Securitisation Regulation affects the development of law outside the EU. In effect, this would mean export 
of the provisions, policy choices and underlying values of the Securitisation Regulation, to a greater or 
lesser extent. Such scenarios can be referred to as secondary transnationalisation, provided that the 
Securitisation Regulation in itself is accepted as an instance of transnational legal ordering (primary 
transnationalisation), as proposed in this Chapter on the basis of the symbiotic relationship between the EU 
and transnational bodies, particularly the BCBS and IOSCO, and the involvement of a broad epistemic 
community in international finance. 
In one scenario, the Securitisation Regulation becomes a model followed by other jurisdictions due 
to its substantive merits. This seems unlikely given that regulatory preferences vary between jurisdictions, 
while the Securitisation Regulation represents a legislative compromise reached under particular 
circumstances,58 rather than an optimal universal model. But it is not impossible either. Indeed, Steven L 
Schwarcz, a prominent US scholar, argues that ‘Europe’s STS proposal goes a long way towards addressing 
complexity [as a cause of market failures]; the United States should consider a similar regulatory 
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approach’.59 Now, jurisdictions planning to introduce a similar regulatory approach may be more inclined 
towards adopting the global STC criteria than the European STS criteria, but the STS criteria and the related 
rules and regulatory and implementing technical standards may prove to be useful models for turning the 
STC criteria into more concrete and detailed domestic rules.60 The EU is an ‘early mover’ in regulation of so-
called high-quality securitisation, so other jurisdictions may wish to follow the EU so as to benefit from the 
efforts it has invested in the Securitisation Regulation. 
Another scenario involves introducing an equivalence regime for third-country securitisers. In 
simple terms, the idea of an equivalence regime is that it ‘allows countries with similar enough legislation 
to the EU to operate under their own rules without forcing firms to comply with two sets of laws’.61 Most of 
EU legislation on financial regulation from recent years enables the Commission to carry out equivalence 
assessments and adopt equivalence decisions,62 but this is not the case with the Securitisation Regulation, 
apparently for Brexit-related reasons.63 
Introduction of an equivalence regime in the future is quite possible, especially since this matter is 
included in the review provisions of Article 46 of the Securitisation Regulation. In Article 46(e), the 
Commission is tasked with considering, for a report to be presented by 1 January 2022, ‘whether in the 
area of STS securitisations an equivalence regime could be introduced for third-country originators, 
sponsors and SSPEs, taking into consideration international developments in the area of securitisation, in 
particular initiatives on simple, transparent and comparable securitisations’. An equivalence regime could 
result in the Securitisation Regulation causing external effects, even export of the STS criteria. For, as Eilís 
Ferran more generally explains, ‘the EU equivalence regime for third countries operates as a mechanism for 
the export of EU financial regulation: as the price for access, the EU insists on the third-country rules being 
close to its own and will do a deep dive into the third-country requirements to check that this is the case’.64 
However, the reference in Article 46(e) to ‘initiatives on simple, transparent and comparable 
securitisations’ may be taken as a hint that equivalence would not be assessed strictly in reference to the 
European STS criteria, but rather to a set of broader principles that the STS criteria and the global STC 
criteria share. This would be in line with the scholarly literature more generally calling for ‘a less heavy-
handed, outcomes-oriented approach’ to equivalence assessments.65 The main export would then not be 
the STS criteria as such, but a broader transnationally developed regulatory model embodied by the STS 
criteria. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter set out to study the new EU Securitisation Regulation as an instance of transnational legal 
ordering. To sum up the findings, we return to two discrete aspects of transnationalisation. These can be 
called primary and secondary transnationalisation for the purposes of presentation. 
 Primary transnationalisation explains why it is apt to speak of the Securitisation Regulation as 
transnational legal ordering, even though it is ordinary EU legislation. The explanation is found in the 
relationship between the EU and transnational bodies, particularly the BCBS and IOSCO, and in the 
involvement of a broad epistemic community in international finance. The relationship between the EU and 
the transnational bodies can be described as a mutualistic symbiosis in that all parties are able to advance 
their aims. The global STC criteria jointly developed by the BCBS and IOSCO were an essential basis for the 
European STS criteria in the Securitisation Regulation. The EU in turn provided the BCBS and IOSCO with 
information and expertise. Even more importantly, by adopting the Securitisation Regulation the EU has 
partially legalised the transnational regulatory model and transnational normativity of the STC criteria, that 
is, has vested them with legal form and legal authority. This legalisation is merely partial because the STS 
criteria deviated significantly from the STC criteria even in the Commission Proposal for a Securitisation 
Regulation and further deviations were added in the course of the EU legislative process. Many of the 
deviations can be explained as additional ‘sustainability features’, whether motivated by investor 
protection, financial stability or environmental considerations – or by crime prevention and security or 
exchange of information in tax matters, which are causes that complement our picture of 
transnationalisation and the symbiosis observation with two further transnational bodies, namely the FATF 
and the OECD. 
 Secondary transnationalisation in turn focuses on effects that the Securitisation Regulation may 
have outside the EU. The Securitisation Regulation in its current form will shut third-country securitisers out 
of the STS framework and may thus cause fragmentation of global markets. But these are not necessarily 
the only, or the most significant, extra-EU effects that the Securitisation Regulation may produce. Indeed, 
the Securitisation Regulation could affect the development of law in other jurisdictions in at least two 
conceivable ways. First, the Securitisation Regulation could become a model for other jurisdictions due to 
its substantive merits. The EU being an ‘early mover’ in this area may incentivise others to follow its choices 
so as to save costs of developing legislation. Second, introduction of an equivalence regime for third-
country securitisers, which is preliminarily envisioned in the review provisions of the Securitisation 
Regulation, could result in export of the STS criteria or a set of broader principles shared by the STS criteria 
and the STC criteria. 
